

## **Considerable but yet insufficient humanitarian relief and rehabilitation activities in parts of drought affected southern Somali Region**

*April - July 2000*

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*by Yves Guinand, UN-Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia*

### **Introduction and background**

Gode, one of nine administrative zones in Somali Region, and its neighbouring Afder Zone are probably among the hardest hit by the drought. Although it is not only the recent drought situation, that is presently increasing poverty and hardship in one of the most isolated areas of Ethiopia. Since Somali Region formally became part of Ethiopia after the British ceded it in 1955, a variety of armed conflicts including civil wars in Somalia and Ethiopia left the region without much needed basic infrastructure development. Permanent civil unrest, insecurity and political instability resulted in the region's political marginalisation from other regions in Ethiopia. This status quo still remains today and is one of the main factors for the extreme hardship that people face in the Somali Region.

These international organisations that decided to provide support to the recent humanitarian crisis in the Somali Region are faced with a multitude of problems of which the present drought is just one. The present crisis emerged out of a disastrous combination of general underdevelopment, marginalisation, and successive climatic disasters leading to a general collapse of the economy and people's living conditions. The Somali Region is witnessing serious structural deficiencies in all public and economic sectors.

The Region lacks an adequate road system. The majority of roads are no more than dry weather tracks that become impassable when it rains. Even the few all weather gravel roads are unreliable. As a result, the road system collapsed in the beginning of May this year with the beginning of the rains right when the first important relief supplies, mainly food, were about to be distributed in affected areas. Most trucks ended up trapped in the mud and bridges were washed away leaving remote zones such as Gode, Afder and Liben deprived of food for more than one month.

Furthermore, the health sector in Somali Region is one of the most poorly developed in Ethiopia (Gebre-Mariam, 1990; Gebre-Mariam and Haile, 1993). This is even more serious when taking into consideration that Ethiopia's health sector nation wide already figures among the poorest in Africa. Other sectors such as education, water and sanitation, agriculture and animal health are similarly poorly developed. Literacy rates are the lowest in Ethiopia (approx. 8%)<sup>1</sup>. There is considerable untapped

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<sup>1</sup> Central Statistical Authority (1998) The 1994 Population and Housing Census for Ethiopia, Results at Country Level, Volume I, Statistical Report, Addis Ababa

water potential especially from the different perennial rivers flowing through the region, i.e. Genale, Weyb and Wabe Shebelle. The latter being the largest river in Ethiopia with a water catchment area of more than 200,000 km<sup>2</sup> and a length of 1340 km inside Ethiopia.

Saudi-Arabia's livestock import ban for countries in the Horn of Africa, activated in the beginning of 1998, unclenched a major economic crisis in pastoralist areas all over the Horn, including Somali Region in Ethiopia. The ban was established after a Rift-Valley-Fever epidemic at the Somalia-Kenyan border in January 1998. Most pastoralists in this areas were producing livestock for export to Saudi-Arabia. The ban forced livestock export cutbacks of up to 90% and consequently led to an overstocking of herds and to massive overgrazing in most parts of the Horn of Africa's pastoralist areas, i.e. Ethiopian Somali Region, Somaliland, Puntland and other parts of former Somalia. Serious shortfalls and delays of the *gu*<sup>2</sup> and *deyr* rains in 1998 and 1999 as well as delayed, short and torrential *gu* rains in May 2000, compounded the problem by decimating livestock population in the pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa. Estimations of livestock losses are controversial, but losses of up to 70% of the total original livestock population seem generally justified and accepted. The combination of these factors left many pastoralist families destitute.

All humanitarian agencies intervening in Somali Region should take into consideration the above-described situation as it may become difficult to justify emergency interventions without taking into account the massive and serious structural deficits this marginalised and neglected region and its inhabitants face. Ideally, the on-going humanitarian emergency interventions should be combined and followed by rehabilitation measures with mid to long term development projects and programmes. This report focuses on the analysis of the current situation of on-going relief activities and provides select constructive recommendations on how to deal with the post-crisis situation.

## The current humanitarian crisis

### ***Limited geographical coverage of humanitarian relief activities***

Even though by now a significant number of international organisations are covering most of the affected areas within the 9 zones in Somali Region, the geographical coverage of their activities is still very limited and concentrated in a few accessible centres and places where the security situation is manageable. The annexed map highlights where international organisations are focusing their humanitarian interventions<sup>3</sup>. The two neighbouring Gode and Afder Zones are a perfect example of uneven relief interventions and efforts. Whereas in Gode Zone some 20 humanitarian relief organisations provide assistance with some 15 physically present with programmes on the ground, less than 10 agencies focus on Afder Zone with only four agencies are physically present (PCAE, SCF/US, Norwegian Church Aid, ICRC). A number of evaluation missions<sup>4</sup> for the Somali drought mentioned in their respective reports the seriousness of the

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<sup>2</sup> See definition in annex 'Glossary of important meteorological and seasonal terms used for Ethiopia's Somali Region'.

<sup>3</sup> The map is not exhaustive and readers are encouraged to inform the UN-EUE of any additional information, changes and inaccuracies occurring on the map.

<sup>4</sup> USAID (2000), A Field Report of Humanitarian Conditions in Afder Zone, Somali Regional National State, 18 to 21 April 2000, unpublished report prepared by USAID, SCF-US, PCAE & Zonal DPPD, 24 April

humanitarian situation in Afder and Liben Zones. But interventions in Afder and Liben zones have been very limited. Even though the international community is aware of the gravity of the problem in these two zones it will be difficult to organise any substantial interventions in the most affected areas. The main constraint is the sheer impossibility of access to the most affected areas, as they are among the most remote. The looting in mid June of one out of four ICRC trucks carrying food from Gode to El Kere and the raiding of OXFAM's newly opened therapeutic feeding centre (TFC) in Deraye village at the border to Afder Zone, are indications that the population is indeed very hungry.

At the time the southern part of Somali Region finally received some rain in the beginning of May, Shinile Zone in the northern part around Hararghe, was still left without rainfall. This new situation caused a reverse migration movement of Shinile pastoralists towards southern parts of Somali Region<sup>5</sup>. In March Somali pastoralists came with their livestock from Koraha, Fik and other zones up to Hararghe and Shinile Zones to look for water and grazing land. Currently pastoralist movements are heading the opposite direction down Dakata river towards Fik and even further down to search for grazing land and water<sup>6</sup>. The humanitarian situation now seems to be deteriorating in additional areas, which previously were better off than the areas journalists and humanitarian organisations focused on in March and April, i.e. Gode, Deg Habour and Koraha Zones.

Fik, Deg Habour, Koraha and parts of Warder Zones had been facing security problems in the past. Currently, there is still a high degree of insecurity remaining, mainly due to the presence of armed opposition groups operating in these zones. An obvious correlation can be noticed between insecurity and the number of relief and development agencies willing to operate and focus on insecure areas. From the above mentioned insecure zones of Somali Region, Fik is getting relatively more attention most likely due to its better accessibility compared to the other insecure areas of the region. In Koraha zone only the French NGO Action Contre la Faim (ACF) is physically present. In Deg Habour and Warder Zones a couple of local NGOs, i.e. Hope for the Horn, Ogaden Welfare Development Association (OWDA), are running some relief activities. At this time, no substantial relief has been delivered to the population of these areas.

### ***Relief food sector faces most serious constraints***

#### *Food deliveries and distributions two months behind schedule*

At the end of June, from a total of 11533 MT of food theoretically allocated for the months of April (3845 MT), May (3844 MT) and June (3844 MT), only 3450 MT, roughly 30%, has been distributed to the affected population.

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UNCT (2000), Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Somali Region, Part II: Afder & Liben Zones, mission undertaken between 19 and 21 May 2000, a UNCT for Ethiopia report, 30 May, Addis Ababa

<sup>5</sup> HCS (Hararghe Catholic Secretariat), Update on the Drought and Livestock Health Situation in Shinile Zone and Babile Wereda of Somali Region, Field Visit Report, 6 June, Dire Dawa

see also Guinand Y (2000), Hararghe Agro-pastoralists Face an Uncertain Future, Focus on livelihoods in selected dependant areas of East and West Hararghe, UN-EUE Field Mission Report, 14 to 21 March, Addis Ababa

<sup>6</sup> UNICEF field visit report, 8 – 10 June 2000, UNICEF Jigjiga field office

Of the 3845 MT food allocations for April 285 MT was missing in Gode Zone as of the last week of June. The May 3844 MT food allocations did not arrive because it was thought that it could neither be loaded, nor transported in time from the central warehouses in Dire Dawa and Jigjiga. To compensate for this loss, SCF-UK organised food distributions in Gode, Fik and Deg Harbour Zones with food borrowed from the EFSR (Emergency Food Security Reserve), funded by DFID (Department for International Development) and transported through companies assigned by the National Transport Co-ordination Committee (NTCC). It turned out that this borrowed food was in fact the missing May DPPC allocations for these three zones. By the beginning of July, 2847 MT (74%) out of the total May food allocation had arrived in Gode Zone.

Of the 3844 MT June allocation, 375 MT of food was received by 6 out of the 46 distribution sites in Gode Zone as reported by the DPPD. This food has not been distributed at once, but kept in the warehouse. However, from the June allocations only a minor part will be distributed due to the three weeks delivery delay. Inadequate transport capacities are the major constraint. Untimely deliveries automatically result in skipping future deliveries and hence programmed food allocations and the individual rations of 12.5 kg of cereals/person/month cannot be met.

On top of the distorted relief food delivery and distribution schedule, it was decided beginning of July to withhold food distributions until the end of July. Some organisations thought there was no need for additional distributions in July despite obvious and serious distribution shortcomings. To withhold food distributions until the end of July may have been politically motivated and in connection with the forthcoming general elections in Somali Region. Fortunately after discussions with other implicated humanitarian inter-actors this plan was dropped and food distributions planned for and carry out in mid July.

#### *Limited transport capacity and security constraints slow down relief food deliveries*

The problem of unmet food allocations is very common all over Ethiopia, not only in Somali Region. Although in Somali Region this problem may be more accentuated due to the inadequate transport and road system and the constant insecurity in certain areas. To transport food or any other items to delivery points in Somali Region, transport operators have to be chosen carefully. For the time being DPPC, which is in charge of transporting and distributing relief food, opted to hire private Somali truck companies and truck owners, preferably with registered Somali license plates. These trucks will face the least amount of problems on Somali roads. Contracting truck companies and truck owners from other parts of the country causes problems, as they need a military escort to move safely. To be escorted, the trucks must wait to organise a convoy. This can take as much as two weeks before they are able to move. Hence, they are creating unnecessary food delivery delays. Another constraint is that Gode Zone is the farthest away from the Dire Dawa and Jigjiga warehouses. Consequently, transport routes are the longest. Many people claim that the main reason for the food delivery delays was due to the *gu* rains but, in fact the rains only made the existing problem a lot worse. Before the rains in December, January and February only a portion of the allocated food rations was delivered and distributed in Gode Zone.

#### *Communication constraints hinder food distribution programming at zonal level*

Food distribution programming is difficult in Gode Zone due to the following communication constraint: the DPPC warehouses in Dire Dawa and Jigjiga inform the DPPD in Gode Zone by radio on the number of trucks and the quantity of food they carry for Gode Zone. But once the trucks leave the warehouses,

no further contact is possible until their arrival at their final destination. This latter contact is only possible when the trucks pass Gode town. If for example food is delivered in East Imi, 200km north-west of Gode town, the Zonal DPPD in Gode has no possibility of verification due to the lack of any communication. This makes any food distribution planning ahead impossible. A sort of verification system along the transport roads should be put in place, so that at the final destination or at least at zonal level, arrival dates and quantity could be known some days ahead for planning purposes. To install HF-Radio sets for the relief food transporting trucks is not possible in Somali Region because as soon as this is known, the trucks would be hijacked and the HF-Radios stolen. But a sort of simple sentinel system could be practical. DPPC/B/D personnel living in villages along the transport routes like for example in Fik and Hamero, could register the passing trucks and inform final destination points at zonal level through existing permanent HF-Radio stations about the trucks and their content.

#### *Very limited infrastructure for food pre-positioning*

Needless to say that above described bottlenecks make relief food pre-positioning impossible. Pre-positioning would have prevented delivery delays caused by the rains and the impassable roads. IN any case, pre-positioning is difficult to realise as most of the 46 distribution sites in Gode Zone lack any sort of food storage facilities. In certain places food can be stored in school or administrative buildings but in most places relief food is unloaded and piled in an open space without any protection from either the ground or from the top. However, food deliveries to the distribution sites are usually immediately distributed to the gathered and waiting hungry crowd of people.

#### *The well known 'Somali-food-targeting-problem'*

This unfortunate communication deficiency and co-ordination resulting from a lack of capacity at all levels, makes food aid targeting virtually impossible. The well known 'Somali-food-targeting-problem', i.e. the difficulty to organise simultaneous food distributions, is rampant in Gode Zone. Simultaneous relief food distributions in Somali Region are actually the only viable and practicable solution to prevent double and triple distributions to the same person or family. The Somalis' mobility, their genius informal and oral information system on top of the local administration's lack of capacity, produce multiple registrations of the same person in different distribution sites and therefore the unfortunate dilution of individual rations. On the other hand, thanks to the multiple registration of individual family members, even though the distributed rations are diluted, some families may get enough food to live on. The UN-EUE interviewed Somali women, who received food rations in a place called Shinile approximately 20km north-east of Denan, Gode Zone. Each person received 1kg of vegetable oil and 5kg of *Unimix*<sup>7</sup> and sorghum. 7km from Shinile another location called Burkaye received relief food supplies from the DPPC and ICRC on the same day. Somehow the local authorities did not manage to distribute the food on the same day as Shinile. The local administrator and other official persons interviewed confirmed that people from neighbouring Shinile village and surroundings, who already received food, would most likely show up the next day for the expected food distribution. These people are definitely registered in both places and will receive double rations as food is usually distributed to everybody who shows up at the distribution site the day food is being handed out. This described case is only one of many encountered

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<sup>7</sup> *Unimix* is a complementary food distributed by ICRC. It is made out of three components: (1) maize 67.5%, (2) soy beans 22.5%, (3) sugar (10%). 100gms are equivalent to 400 kcal.

cases in Somali Region. Findings indicate that unfortunately this undesired food distribution practice is more commonplace than exceptional.

### *Problematic food monitoring*

Food monitoring for international organisations, and in particular the United Nations Organisations, is a difficult undertaking in Somali Region, mainly due to the prevailing security situation and the limited accessibility of many of the distribution sites. The World Food Programme (WFP) finances a number of food monitors from a local NGO, the Ogaden Welfare Society (OWS), to undertake the monitoring and reporting of food deliveries. Similar to DPPC/B/D, this local NGO lacks sufficient logistics capacity, i.e. cars. Consequently, food monitoring remains very limited. Suggestions have been proposed to make use of the chartered plane, which liases regularly between Addis Ababa and a number of places within Somali Region, for food and other monitoring operations. This recommendation was tested at the end of June with the first air monitoring operations from Gode. WFP is now undertaking regular food monitoring visits by air to as many places as possible in the Somali National Regional State. Currently, air-monitoring operations are carried out by the food monitor co-ordinator based in Jigjiga. It remains unclear why zonal WFP food monitors, such as the ones based in Gode, are not carrying out air-monitoring activities. In addition to the chartered aeroplane, the United Nations rented a small helicopter to be based in Dire Dawa for food monitoring and security evaluation missions in parts of Somali Region.

### ***Nutritional status, feeding centres and the affected population's expectations***

Despite a couple of general food distributions organised by ICRC and the DPPD, the global and severe malnutrition rate remains high and indicates a catastrophic situation in the vicinity of Denan village, Gode Zone. The nutritional survey prepared by MSF-Belgium in mid-May 2000 found that 50% of the under-five children in the village and in the MSF camps are malnourished. On the other hand, mortality rates dropped in Denan since MSF-Belgium's intervention and the distribution of general food rations<sup>8</sup>. However, it is expected that the nutritional status generally remains alarmingly low for Gode and other neighbouring zones such as Afder Zone, because general circumstances, such as the lack of adequate general food distributions, are similar.

Feeding centres, in particular therapeutic feeding centres that have been set up by international NGOs in different parts of Gode Zone, are facing a variety of problems including low admission rates due to a lack of initial capacity, appropriate and sufficient food, and qualified personnel.

Experienced agencies setting up therapeutic feeding centres normally following an initial standard medical protocol, that includes the treatment of the admitted malnourished cases with measles immunisation, malaria prophylactics, vitamin A prescriptions and the like, before any therapeutic feeding is administered. Patients with communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, are isolated and treated

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<sup>8</sup> MSF-Belgium (2000), Nutritional Survey & Retrospective Mortality Assessment Denan, Ogaden, Ethiopia, survey undertaken between 16 and 18 May.

MSF-Belgium (2000), Emergency Intervention Denan, Gode Zone, Somali Regional State, Activity Report 25<sup>th</sup> April to 25<sup>th</sup> June (Both reports are available upon request from the following e-mail address: [msfbaa@telecom.net.et](mailto:msfbaa@telecom.net.et))

separately. MSF-France and MSF-Belgium set up therapeutic feeding centres in East Imi and Denan respectively and are following these necessary standard procedures. Data to identify significant trends in the feeding centres concerning number of admitted, cured, transferred to supplementary feeding or dead could not yet be analysed as the centres have not been operating long enough to make a valuable trend analysis. MSF-Belgium has been operating its feeding centre in Denan since 26<sup>th</sup> of April and MSF-France in East Imi since 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 2000<sup>9</sup>.

The main problem now concerning the feeding centres run by OWS and SCF-US in Gode town, is the population's attitude towards and expectations from these centres. Relief personnel noticed that women, who bring or are advised to admit their malnourished children to the centre, are mainly expecting medical treatment such as injections or tablets for their malnourished child. They are not prepared to stay with their child for feeding. Either there is a lack of knowledge concerning malnutrition and its treatments among Somali women or there is a certain lack of confidence. Severely malnourished children first need emergency medical treatment. Their immune system is disturbed and they carry diseases, which have to be treated before they are able to eat and digest food. OWS did initially set up and run two centres in Gode town. Unfortunately in the beginning, the mortality rate was as high as 40% in these therapeutic feeding centres. This may be attributed to the fact that OWS did not have the necessary qualified personnel available and in place to run their therapeutic feeding centres. Hence, the above-described necessary standard medical protocol was not initialised and therefore, malnourished children were not treated effectively when admitted to the centre. Consequently, following the considerable number of deaths in the centres, people became suspicious, lost confidence and were reluctant to admit their malnourished children to the centres. Since SCF-US took over from OWS and now experienced personnel are in charge, the general conditions and circumstances of the centres and its patients are gradually improving. ACF in its progress report<sup>10</sup> (22 June to 5 July) describes similar experiences with its TFC in Kebre Dehar. ACF reports that Somali pastoralist

'(...) do not specifically move to treat their malnourished children but to gain financial resources, and eventually take their children to the ACF TFC and SFC as it is available. Pastoralists tend to migrate to towns when they have lost their remaining animals, and specifically to preserve the health of their children. They give priority to the strongest of their children.' (ACF, 2000: p.2)

And furthermore:

'The fact that only few children were referred to TFC, underlines problems met by ACF team to convince mothers to have their children to follow long treatment there.' (ACF, 2000: p.4)

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<sup>9</sup> MSF-France (2000), Medico-Nutritional Support of the Malnourished in Imi East, Gode Zone, Somali National Regional State, activity report 21 May to 2 July, Addis Ababa (MSF-France Ethiopia reports available upon request from the following e-mail address: [addis.msff@telecom.net.et](mailto:addis.msff@telecom.net.et))

<sup>10</sup> ACF (2000), Emergency Intervention Korahai Zone, Somali National Regional State, Activity Progress Report, 22 June to 5 July, Addis Ababa (ACF-Ethiopia reports available upon request from the following e-mail address: [aicf@telecom.net.et](mailto:aicf@telecom.net.et))

SCF-US and ACF are organising now training and health education sessions for mothers of malnourished children to teach them about the importance of the intensive therapeutic treatment necessary to cure their children.

The Ogaden Welfare Development Association (OWDA), a local NGO in collaboration with the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) opened a therapeutic feeding centre in Hadawe village on 26 June 2000. Hadawe is a small village situated on the road halfway between Gode and Denan. OWDA has been criticised by the NGO community in Gode for not being professional enough to open and run a therapeutic feeding centre. The main reason for criticism was to prevent previous mistakes committed in the therapeutic feeding centres in Gode town. A couple of experienced NGOs and UNICEF offered their knowledge and help to OWDA's therapeutic feeding centre in Hadawe.

The absence of regular and sufficient basic relief food distributions provoked temporary absences of women and children from the therapeutic feeding centres in Gode town and hence, interruption of the children's treatment. On relief food registration days, the centres are found empty because all the people want to be registered for relief food distributions. DPPD failed to assure people in the centres that they indeed would also be registered directly through the centre. Furthermore, mothers of the malnourished children are not supported in the centres, i.e. only the malnourished child is being fed or the child's ration is shared with his mother. Mothers or who ever accompanies the malnourished child, have to search for food themselves. Additionally, most mothers have other children at home that they have to feed and look after. Above-mentioned circumstances result in low recovery rates of the severely malnourished children.

Among the severely malnourished patients admitted to the therapeutic feeding centres, there are always a few tuberculosis (TB) cases, which have to be treated separately. NGOs and other concerned relief organisations are discussing their respective commitment and long term solutions for an effective treatment. MSF-Belgium, with acquired experience in the Somali Region through its TB programme in Jigjiga set up in 1997, is now supporting the Gode hospital in this matter. TB patients can now be transferred to Gode hospital for further treatment. MSF-Belgium intends to commit itself to the treatment of TB patients in a number of locations in Somali Region, especially for the post-emergency phase.

Most international NGOs running health and nutritional activities in Somali Region soon noticed the extremely poor hygiene and sanitation conditions people live in and that it is the source of many intestinal diseases. Most people are unaware of the most basic hygienic precautions and one of the major sources for diseases is the consumption of polluted water. Therefore, international relief organisations have started with basic health education programmes in their feeding centres, in health centres, for IDPs (Internally Displaced People) in camps and in the Gode hospital.

### ***Overall livestock conditions improved***

Despite rains at the beginning of May, which contributed to the rapid improvement of pasture and water availability in the zone, the physical condition of livestock, especially cattle, has not yet improved significantly. Most pastoralists in the area claim to have lost between 70% and 90% of their cattle stock since 1999. Most cattle died before this season's *gu* rains. Additionally, the flooding caused by heavy torrential rains in the beginning of May drowned an unknown number of animals. Many animals were too weak to withstand the heavy surface water runoff. The remaining goats and camels are recovering. Around Gode and along the road to Kelafo, many cattle carcasses can still be found. As pastoralists generally exaggerate livestock losses, their claims on losses have to be taken with care. On the other



hand, SERP (South-East Rangeland Project) estimates the number of livestock losses within the Somali Region from November 1999 to April 2000, much less dramatic. From an estimated total livestock population of approximately 19,800,000 roughly 30% (approx. 6,000,000) have died. The estimated percentage of cattle, which perished is even lower, i.e. 25%. The exact number of livestock that perished will never be known. Considering that the SERP estimation is based on SCK-UK livestock estimations dating back to 1994, the percentage of lost livestock, especially cattle, is likely to be over 50% of the pre-drought population. One should not forget that the 1998 livestock ban led to overstocking of cattle herds. The overstocking disturbed the already fragile ecology because of obvious overgrazing in many parts of Somali Region.

### **Recovering terms of trade but prices remain low due to lack of purchasing power**

Table 1 below shows that neither livestock nor crops listed have yet reached May 1999 price and trade levels. Since April 2000 at the peak of the drought, prices are slowly recovering and terms of trade are becoming more favourable. Current market prices are still very low compared to last year's because the drought caused a general fall of local purchase power. Many families became destitute and many were left without livestock, without seed or any other commodities.

**Table 1: Average market prices in Gode town central market**

Traded goods	End of June 2000	End of May 2000	April 2000	May 1999	Recent trend (April – June)	Trend compared to last year
<b>Livestock</b>						
Cattle	650 Birr/piece	550 Birr/piece	142 Birr/piece	800 Birr/piece	↑	↓
Goat	110 Birr/piece	105 Birr/piece	44 Birr/piece	125 Birr/piece	↑	↓
Sheep	70 Birr/piece	60 Birr/piece	40 Birr/piece	125 Birr/piece	↑	↓
Donkey	250 Birr/piece	No price available	No price available	400 Birr/piece (June 1999)	N/A	↓
Camel	1000 Birr/piece	800 Birr/piece	650 Birr/piece	1300 Birr/piece	↑	↓
<b>Crops</b>						
Maize	124 Birr/100kg	180 Birr/100kg	140 Birr/100kg	240 Birr/100kg	↓	↓
Wheat	90 Birr/100kg	114 Birr/100kg	150 Birr/100kg	260 Birr/100kg	↓	↓
Sorghum	100 Birr/100kg	140 Birr/100kg	150 Birr/100kg	160 Birr/100kg	↓	↓
Rice	378 Birr/100kg	420 Birr/100kg	400 Birr/100kg	410 Birr/100kg	→	→
<b>Other basic goods</b>						
Sugar	334 Birr/100kg	360 Birr/100kg	370 Birr/100kg	330 Birr/100kg	↓	→
Oil	5.0 Birr/1lt	5.5 Birr/1lt	7.5 Birr/1lt	7.5 Birr/1lt	↓	→

Livestock prices are slowly recovering, animal fattening is taking place, but market opportunities and export prospects with Saudi-Arabia are still low. Local purchases remain low, as people do not have money. Therefore, livestock prices remain relatively low compared to last year.

Wheat, maize and sorghum prices have been decreasing since April 2000 due to relief food distributions. Maize has not been distributed but imported relief food wheat and sorghum are considered as maize substitutes. Maize prices remained low on the local market because of the substitution effect and low maize purchases. This situation may cause market disturbances once the locally grown maize is available not allowing local farmers to receive a decent price. It has been suggested that the DPPC and humanitarian organisations try local purchases to help stabilise the maize price and support the local economy especially since relief food distributions caused these disturbances of local market price mechanisms.

A substantial quantity of ICRC's relief oil, which is part of their complementary food package, is being traded on the market for other commodities. Hence, the price for vegetable oil decreased from the usual 7.5 Birr/litre to 5.0 Birr/litre. The 5 litre Jerry cans distributed by ICRC as part of a complementary ration are now sold for 25 Birr on the market in Gode town. Each day a couple of dozen of these Jerry cans find their way to Gode airport and to Addis Ababa, where, undoubtedly, they are sold with a significant benefice.

### ***The need for better relief co-ordination and information exchange***

Even though information exchange and co-ordination activities at all levels, including government agencies and the Task Force co-ordination body for Gode Zone are by now fairly well established, some sectors, notably general food distribution, and activities such as water rehabilitation, need improvement.

#### *General food distributions in Gode Zone*

General food distributions still lack effective co-ordination. The government body seems to be unable to cope and co-ordinate with the other involved parties of which ICRC is the most important. ICRC is regularly preparing and handing over their distribution lists to DPPD, but neither DPPC/B/D nor its partners WFP and OWS seem to be able to plan, and monitor food distributions in a co-ordinated way. Therefore, in some places beneficiaries benefited from both ICRC and DPPD food rations on several occasions whereas in other places people are still awaiting their first ration. Lack of co-ordination in the food sector is caused by a number of shortcomings, some of which are being described in the relief food sector section of this report. In addition, responsible government agencies fail to send representatives to the weekly food and non-food subcommittee meetings where food matters are discussed and decisions are taken. In fact, these sub-committee meetings had to be cancelled a number of times because the most important actors and decision-makers were not present. This makes co-ordination in the food sector virtually impossible.

#### *The Kelafo water system rehabilitation efforts*

Kelafo village, 80 kilometres from Gode town downstream the Wabe Shebelle river, received a modern water collection and purification system, installed by the Regional Water Bureau with financial support from UNICEF in 1996/97. Unfortunately, due to lack of maintenance and technical knowledge and without a budget to cover the running costs, the water system broke down after three years. The Regional Water Bureau has been searching for ways to rehabilitate the system but has not yet been able to allocate the necessary funds. With the current emergency situation, international organisations dropped into the area to offer their help in different sectors. A number of NGOs showed their interest in contributing to the rehabilitation of the Kelafo water supply system, i.e. SCF-US, THW (Technische Hilfswerke<sup>11</sup>), and UNICEF. Minor repairs were needed on the piping system, cleaning of the sedimentation tanks, maintenance on the generator, generator spare parts and the system needed a new water pump.

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<sup>11</sup> THW (Technische Hilfswerke) is a German governmental technical relief organisation, which is mainly giving technical and logistic support to other NGOs. In Gode THW operates one 4X4 UNIMOG truck, which can be used by any NGO, which is in need of such a vehicle. MSF-France for example made use of THW's transport facilities to transport material from Gode to Imi to set up their therapeutic feeding centre.

Coincidentally it was reported to the Task Force relief co-ordination body in Gode town, that THW in collaboration with Guardian-SERRO (Guardian-Somali-Ethiopian Relief & Rehabilitation Organisation) project, a local NGO operating in and around Kelafo, decided to rehabilitate the water system. THW ordered a generator and water pump, spare parts and the necessary piping material in Germany together with an engineer to install and rehabilitate the system. This decision was taken without informing the Regional Water Bureau, which has a representative in Gode town, and without discussing the matter at one of the Task Force sub-committee meetings with the other interested partners. Luckily, the matter could be discussed and solved in time before another organisation took the same steps to order machinery and material for rehabilitation. UNICEF agreed to direct its funding towards the running costs (fuel for the pump and generator), technical training for the system operators and for the formation of a water committee in Kelafo, which will be responsible for the maintenance of the whole system.

Bypassing governmental offices as well as failing to inform the humanitarian relief co-ordination body in place, frequently happens with inexperienced humanitarian relief organisations. Such organisations have to be involved in the existing information-sharing system to avoid unpleasant and unnecessary confusion among relief inter-actors.

### ***Security remains unpredictable***

Security in and around Gode Zone is mainly being hampered by (1) local sub-clan fighting along Wabe Shebelle river for grazing and agricultural land, (2) politically motivated incidents and acts of banditry and (3) famine related raids and looting. Whereas for the first security-incidents-category international humanitarian relief organisations and its personnel are usually neither targeted nor implicated. Yet implication and targeting of humanitarian inter-actors is very likely to be the case for the latter two categories.

#### *Local sub-clan fighting along Wabe Shebelle river for grazing and agricultural land*

Local sub-clan disputes and fighting for land along the Wabe Shebelle river usually occurs after the rains, when different interests collide, i.e. grazing animals versus irrigation for agricultural purposes. The most serious incident of the sort occurred in the beginning of June in a location called 'Barda Korah' about 26 km north-west of Gode Town in West Gode District. The Reer Kassim and the Reer Hassan Aden sub-clans clashed and as a result 12 people (8 and 4 from each group) were killed and several others wounded. Negotiations with elders and even with members of the Regional government, who flew in from Jigjiga to settle the dispute remained fruitless until the end of June when the military intervened and took away the new born baby camels from both of the groups. Camels are the pride of the Somalis. Camel babies separated from their mothers cannot survive for a long time without the mother milk. By taking the baby camels, the military successfully forced the two parties to come to an agreement and to negotiate compensation. The incident inflicted a curfew in Gode town for about three weeks and tensions in other locations such as Hadawe and Denan where members of the two sub-clans are also present.

Near Kelafo in a place called 'Karinka', tensions were also high in June between the Abu Duaq and the Mahad Abdelle sub-clans on land use rights. One of the two sub-clans owns a water pump with which they are irrigating land for agricultural activities whereas the other sub-clan wants to feed its animals on the fertile riverside land. The Gode Zonal Administrator mediated between the two fractions and was able to resolve the dispute without carnage.

The above-described inter-clan fighting usually does not affect and interfere with humanitarian relief activities. These disputes are kept among the concerned Somali groups and fractions. Nevertheless, it is not advisable to travel through or deliver relief goods in a territory where clan fighting is taking place.

#### *Politically motivated security incidents and acts of banditry*

This security-incidents-category is considered the most susceptible and dangerous for humanitarian inter-actors. Attacking, capturing and taking hostage members of international relief organisations are commonplace in politically insecure regions and countries at war. Most security incidents, in which international humanitarian and development organisations have been implicated the last two years in Somali Region, are politically motivated. Less frequently security incidents involving international organisations are pure acts of banditry, i.e. hijacking and stealing of cars and other equipment.

MSF- Belgium operating in Denan felt menaced and insecure for a couple of weeks in May and June after a commercial lorry driving from Gode to Denan was stopped by armed people on the road, deviated into the bush and its passengers stripped of their clothes. Two days later a MSF-Belgium Land Rover with international staff on board observed armed men waiting along the road side and prepared to stop the vehicle. More armed men were a bit further back the road waiting in the bush. Fortunately the MSF-Belgium Land Rover was waved to pass. But following these two incidents MSF-Belgium decided to withhold all travel by road. Several other security incidents have so far been reported between Gode and Denan and in the vicinity of Denan as well as in the area between Denan and Kebe Dehar. It is a known secret that splitter groups of Al-Ittihad Al-Islam Islamic fundamentalists and sympathisers are still living and sporadically operating in the area. Further up north and towards Kebe Dehar the operation area of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) begins. Informal but secure sources indicate that generally it has been agreed among the various opposition groups, that neither relief operations nor international humanitarian organisations should be targeted for political purposes. But none of the groups can guarantee total security. Some splitter groups may not want to follow or may not know about the agreed policy of their respective leaders.

Also in June, vehicles from two international NGOs driving on the Imi-Gode road encountered a group of armed men, who tried to stop the vehicles. They managed to stop the second vehicle but not the first, which was driving too fast. The leader of the armed group advised the travellers of the second car to pay 'road tax' or to make any other contributions to the local population. It seems that these people are more likely to belong to the bandit and brigand category, most likely to steal from wealthy looking international organisations. Nevertheless, the first car did not stop but decided to continue. It was later reported that the crew of this vehicle driving frequently on the Imi-Gode road never cares to stop when asked by locals. Knowing the Somalis temperament, it would be much wiser to stop and give a package of cigarettes or some money than risking to get shot at.

However, it is obvious that in a set-up such as is the case for Somali Region with a minimum to no security guarantees from the governmental side, international relief organisations are not only attracting hungry people but also people with other interests. Furthermore, the national election process, which was carried out in May in all other regions of Ethiopia except Somali Region, may possibly create some disturbances and security incidents in the coming weeks of July and August.

### *Famine related raids and looting*

Famine related raids and looting did occur in mid June on two occasions in Gode and Afder Zone. The newly opened OXFAM GB feeding centre in Deraye, a village near the Afder Zone border, west of Gode town, was raided and all the supplementary food stocked in the centre was stolen. Also around mid June, when ICRC was transporting complementary food rations to El Kere in Afder Zone, one of the five lorries was hijacked and looted on the Gode-El Kere road. Fortunately the lorry could later be recovered. These two incidents and a few other similar but minor ones should be interpreted as desperate acts of hungry and destitute people, badly needing food to survive, rather than acts of banditry or politically motivated actions. These acts tell also rather clearly, that people are indeed very hungry.

## **Conclusions and recommendations**

### ***Immediate major humanitarian challenge to reduce malnutrition***

#### *Secure basic relief food rations*

As malnutrition rates with children under five years of age are still unacceptably high in Gode Zone, the immediate focus of all emergency interventions should aim at reducing malnutrition rates. Malnutrition rates can only be reduced if basic relief food rations are being secured within the most affected areas. Therapeutic and supplementary feeding becomes somewhat senseless, if basic rations are not being provided in a sufficient amount. Therefore, relief food transportation, deliveries and distributions have to be organised more efficiently. To organise the relief food sector more efficiently would mean to reorganise it differently at all levels. The way the relief food sector is being managed in Ethiopia especially in Somali Region is far from ideal. The sheer lack of communication between the various participants and inter-actors in the food sector at the warehouses, the road hauliers and the recipients at destination, makes any planning ahead impossible. Even for other humanitarian inter-actors being active in sectors such as health and nutrition, inefficiency in the food sector hampers their activities significantly. In certain cases, for instance for therapeutic and supplementary feeding, inefficiency in the food sector direct feeding efforts to a dead end or to a vicious circle. Not being able to survive on a basic food ration, cured and released malnutrition victims are soon knocking again at the feeding centre's door.

#### *Organise simultaneous food distributions*

To prevent double and triple ration distribution to one and the same individual and to prevent dilution of food rations, local authorities have to make a serious effort to try and organise simultaneous relief food distributions. Of course this tactic is again based on the presumption that relief food deliveries from the central warehouses are arriving in sufficient amount and on regular bases, which is not yet the case.

#### *Boost emergency seed distributions*

Even though there has been some emergency seed distributions, mainly by ICRC, for agropastoralists and farmers along the Wabe Shebelle river for the current *hagaa* season, the amount was very small and insufficient. For the coming *jilal* season seeds may only be distributed to those few farmers enjoying artificial irrigation along one of the perennial rivers because the *deyr* rains have not been sufficient in previous years for a secondary harvest in January/February. ICRC, FAO and governmental bodies are discussing the matter for the coming season.

### *UN-specific emergency activities; more direct field presence needed*

Concerning UN-specific emergency activities, a work environment should be created which allows active field monitoring activities run by the directly involved operational agencies which are for the time being WFP and UNICEF. WHO may step in at a later stage. To create this favourable work environment, the necessary logistics structure and all essential equipment has to be put in place. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case with the newly built UN Gode Field Office. The UN Gode Field Office is lacking the required number of vehicles and radio equipment to satisfy existing UN security standards and regulations to operate in the field. Therefore, personnel stationed in the UN Gode Field Office are unable to carry out their required field monitoring duties outside Gode town. On the other hand, if the equipment in place does not meet the required UN security standards, security issues should be handled in such a flexible way that still would allow field workers and monitors to accomplish part of their fieldwork. UN field monitoring activities have been so scarce in Somali Region that one might as well evaluate them as insufficient and therefore ineffective. When it comes to operating in a potentially insecure environment like Somali Region, risks have to be calculated accordingly. To make the decision to operate in a well-known high risk area already implies that who ever is willing to work there is also aware and willing to face certain unpredictable risks. Therefore, the UNCT and therein the Field Security Plan Office should take action and change security guidelines in place or withdraw, reduce field presence in the UN Gode Field Office, or take action to create a secure work environment with essential equipment.

### ***The need to encourage post-crisis rehabilitation and development activities***

#### *Long term development commitment required*

This year's massive media attention given to the Somali Region triggered off substantial financial resources and humanitarian relief aid. The humanitarian focus on the region has lasted longer than it ever did in the past. For the first time the UNCT decided to build a field office to mark a permanent presence in the region. The UNCT plans to open other offices in Afder or Liben Zone in addition to the one established in Gode Zone. It is hoped that several of the international NGOs now present and operating emergency and rehabilitation activities, will decide to stay on and engage in basic infrastructure development activities. The current drought and emergency situation should be seen as an opportunity to launch and establish longer-term rehabilitation and development programmes and projects for Somali Region.

The UNCT Gode Field Office should ideally become a platform to initiate and implement much needed basic infrastructure development programmes for Somali Region as well as acting as an early warning unit for the southern Somali Region.

Longer term rehabilitation and development interventions for pastoralist areas range from rehabilitation of the pastoral sector by enabling the destitute to re-enter pastoralism - and hence reducing pressure on herders' incomes, to interventions that encourage the shift to other forms of livelihood, diversification of livelihood activities, such as settlement and irrigated agriculture along perennial rivers.

### *Initiate basic data collection surveys for Somali Region*

One of many constraints concerning Somali Region is the absence of any reliable basic statistical data. Even though the 1994 population census (CSA, 1998) had to be redone in Somali Region and was finally delayed by three years, the reliability of the data still remains unknown. In pastoralist areas data concerning livestock should be given particular importance. Unfortunately, only very few rough and unreliable figures are actually available. Yet rehabilitation and especially development activities need to be planned on the bases of statistical baseline data, if any potential for success should be expected. A timid starting point has been made during the current emergency operation. International NGOs are collecting useful data on health and nutrition and in other sectors for their project area. The dimension of the Somali people's hardship is now slowly being discovered and recognised. Dramatic nutritional survey results in places of Gode Zone indicate that undernourishment and malnutrition are an unfortunate chronic characteristic of the locals. Therefore, temporarily established feeding centres are not of great help in the long run if it is a matter of improving the Somali people's health and nutritional status.

Concerning data collection on livestock, FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) plans to initiate and establish disease surveillance and a market monitoring systems for Somali Region. FAO intends to cooperate with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), DPPC, international NGOs and the SERP project based in Jigjiga and Gode.

### *Early warning and reaction capacity needed for emergency interventions in the livestock sector*

As mentioned above, basic livestock data is missing. As a first measure, it is proposed to set up a disease surveillance system for pastoralist areas, particularly for Somali Region. Furthermore, FAO proposes to install a simple livestock market monitoring system. These two systems will provide the necessary basic data that could be the starting point and decision making basis for future development activities as well as the basis to build an early warning and reaction system for the livestock sector.

FAO feels that there is an urgent need to build an early warning and reaction system for pastoralist areas, focused on livestock within Ethiopia for future drought disasters. It is not the first time that a proposal is being made for a drought contingency plan for pastoralist areas. In 1997 the UN-EUE published a discussion paper on how to set up a drought contingency plan to support pastoralists livelihoods in Ethiopia (Hogg, 1997). In Ethiopia there is no lack of good ideas and viable proposals on how to deal with drought affected pastoralist areas. What is lacking is the implementation of effective early warning programmes. Hogg reported that

'Certainly in Ethiopia's pastoral areas based on present experience 1) no warning system currently in place is likely to pick up the first early signs of drought/stress, 2) there is no adequate in situ mechanism for an early response which could commit sufficient resources to make a difference-in other words there is a large gap between warning and response, and 3) there is no indication that the necessary pre-planning for emergency auctions/purchase has been carried out. (...) Unfortunately, until a real crisis has developed it is unlikely that an early response could be realistically expected from either government or donors. And by the time a crisis has developed it is too late in any case, because the kinds of livestock being sold will already be too thin to be marketable.' (Hogg, 1997: p.11)

In pastoralist areas people make a living with livestock. Livestock represents their wealth and capital. Livestock is ranked as the most valuable resource and wealth indicator. Yet, nobody ever thought of live

saving activities for livestock in pastoralist areas. Live saving activities mainly focus on saving human lives. A pastoralist without livestock is like a farmer without land; he cannot survive.

FAO together with the Ministry of Agriculture and DPPC, as well as the involvement of international NGOs and international livestock research and development institutions such as ILCA (International Livestock Research Institute) and SERP may co-operate to elaborate guidelines for an early warning and reaction system focused on life saving activities in the livestock sector. DPPC has not yet been involved in the livestock sector but one could imagine that it might get involved for example for providing and transporting supplementary feeding for endangered livestock. Such operations have been carried out in July and August 1999 in South Welo, where with beer brewing by-products from the 'Bati' beer brewery in Kombolcha a fodder provision scheme was established by the zonal Department of Agriculture and DPPD. The by-product was transported and delivered to areas where livestock suffered fodder shortages (Hammond & Eggenberger, 1999).

#### *Restocking or creating alternative livelihood opportunities?*

Restocking used to be a popular form of emergency and rehabilitation intervention in pastoralist areas of East Africa and the Horn in the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. Hogg is giving a good literature review in his article. However, much of the literature on restocking is based on OXFAM's experience in northern Kenya between 1983 and 1988. In Hogg's opinion

'Restocking may be a popular intervention with pastoralists but it only offers hope to a small number and, even these, are unlikely to survive subsequent droughts. The reality of pastoral areas is that 'crashes' are an inevitable aspect of life, and, while restocking may offer temporary respite for several years, most restocked families will succumb to subsequent downturns in the economy.' (Hogg, 1997: p.16)

Livestock experts with FAO do have similar opinions on the potential of restocking. Hogg (1997: p.17) puts it that way: restocking is '(...) a temporary solution to the symptoms of an underlying problem - too many livestock and people on the range.' Instead of restocking, a longer term and more viable solution should include alternatives to pastoralism or at least to ensure that the pastoral system can be sufficiently buffered against shock such as periodic droughts. One alternative would be to cash values accumulated in good years, e.g. to sell livestock and to put the money away as savings for bad times and to buy back part of the lost assets to recover from drought. Like in the degraded densely populated parts of the highlands of Ethiopia, a diversification of the resource asset base is needed for pastoralist areas alike. Unfortunately, this is easier said than realised.

#### *From pastoralism to agropastoralism and small scale farming*

In the long run it is likely that part of the pastoralist population may settle along perennial rivers and learn how to practice agriculture. This is already being observed along parts of the Wabe Shebelle river. Ideally and hopefully the arable and fertile land on the riverbank between Imi and Mustahil will not be distributed or bought by private entrepreneurs or exploited by the government like it has been the case during the former Mengistu regime. Otherwise the Somalis will face similar problems like their Afar neighbours. Afars have been evicted from their dry season grazing lands due to large-scale irrigation development along the Awash River and the creation and protection of the area of Awash National Park. The following opinion is shared: 'Even if the resources are to be exploited, the full participation



and integration of the Somalis in future irrigation or agropastoralist projects is indispensable' (Gebre-Mariam, 1993).

Part of the land from the former Gode state farm, which used to be a resettlement project during Mengistu's Derg regime, has been handed over to locals from 1992 onwards. Around the same time UNDP initiated an agricultural development project with the objective to contribute to the achievement of food security for Gode Zone. But UNDP pulled out after the preparatory phase and in 1994 the regional government became in charge of the project, which became the South Gode Agricultural Settlement Project (SGASP). The UNDP project failed because it has been planned on inappropriate and unrealistic presumptions. The project was not adapted to local circumstances, the timeframe given for implementation was far from realistic, and the recommended farm layout was by no means manageable by the involved trial farmers.

Since UNDP's pullout the government is covering the running costs for the water pumps, the service workshop and a number of government employees. A dozen farming associations and 2000 households are presently cultivating around 2000 hectares of land. There are also a number of women farming associations supported by the South Gode Agricultural Settlement Project. Many households are newcomers to agricultural activities and therefore need substantial input in terms of training and support. The government state farm lacks financial support and capacity to support all the newcomers as well as the already established farmers. But over the past few years there is a trend being observed, that more pastoralist families are beginning to settle along the Wabe Shebelle river and try to cultivate crops. There seems a clear need and potential for small-scale agricultural activities based on irrigation. Instead of developing large scale private and state farms, which would not benefit the locals, why not support local initiatives and backstop a number of small local development projects. UNDP along with a number of international NGOs would be most welcomed to participate in this small-scale development process that may be helping a number of destitute pastoralists to build a new livelihood along Wabe Shebelle river.

In the vicinity of Kelafo, approximately 80 kilometres from Gode, downstream Wabe Shebelle river, an Italian NGO called CCM (Comitato Collaborazione Medica), initiated food-for-work activities with local farmers and farming associations. The building of new irrigation channels and the maintenance of the built ones are the main food-for-work activities. These activities seem to work fine with the exception that CCM now lacks food to pay the food-for-work participants. More such kind of small-scale initiatives could be thought of especially for settled farmers and agropastoralists. WFP may think of launching such kind of activities for Somali Region along perennial rivers such as the Wabe Shebelle river. Between Imi and Ferfer that is a stretch of approximately 380 kilometres, best alluvial land is available for agriculture, yet only very little is being exploited for growing food crops.

#### *Basic health education and TB programme for Somali Region*

Tuberculosis is one of the common and endemic diseases that causes problems for emergency oriented health interventions. International organisations and the zonal health office in Gode town are looking for an organisation that would commit itself to a long-term effective TB treatment programme. MSF-Belgium is running a tuberculosis programme in Jigjiga since 1997 and agreed to take care of TB patients in Gode Zone. The patients can be referred to Gode hospital for further treatment. MSF-Belgium is preparing a proposal together with the Ministry of Health for a larger and long-term TB programme in Somali Region.

The extremely poor hygienic and sanitation conditions in Somali Region made international relief organisation initiate basic health and sanitation training for people in their feeding centres, for IDPs and in health clinics and hospitals. The Ministry of Health should take up basic health education and initiate a dissemination programme for Somali Region. Most of the rampant and endemic intestinal diseases are due to the consumption of polluted and untreated water. In general, the health sector is lacking the very basics to function and deliver at least minimal services to the pastoralist population. Therefore, all efforts to help establish basic health facilities and to rehabilitate existing centres are most welcomed. WHO may reinforce its commitment and direct additional financial resources for the health sector development in Somali Region. In addition, the health sector badly needs better-trained local personnel. Many international organisations hired local health personnel from the respective zonal health offices, resulting in a most inconvenient absence of the already scarce health personnel in the state-run health facilities. Efforts should be undertaken by the present international organisations operating in the health sector, to train and educate local community health workers and eventually even nurses.

#### *Sustainable water rehabilitation and development required*

Water rehabilitation activities are well under way. Most humanitarian relief organisations are undertaking well and borehole rehabilitation as well as constructing new wells to ease the water problem of the region. But this emergency rehabilitation is not enough. What is needed is the elaboration and establishment of a locally sustainable approach to run and maintain the rehabilitated, newly constructed or installed water systems. Usually emergency rehabilitation comprised the supply of the necessary material and knowledge from outside and the ready-made hand over of a system, a well or a borehole to the local authorities or community. Training on maintenance is minimal and usually nobody is made responsible. That's how these systems brought in and constructed to face and cope with an emergency situation, collapse after not too long, become useless and in the end no progress is being made to ease the population's hardship.

In this respect emergency interventions in Somali Region in 2000 will not be much different from previous interventions. After one or two years there will be a couple of additional equipment, materials, machinery and other carcasses rusting away in the dust and under the hot Somali sun. To build something sustainable needs long-term commitment and human resources on the spot, and not necessarily a lot of money. UNICEF may get involved in some of the proposed training activities for newly rehabilitated water systems such as in Kelafo. The Regional Water Bureau would like to initiate local water committees comprising all users of the system. These committees would be responsible for the maintenance and the running costs of the system by raising water fees from its members and users. Although creating local water committees seems to be a valid idea, it has been tried before and usually most unsuccessfully. The problems are always the same; lack of responsibility towards the community and generally, missing solidarity among families, sub-clans, clans etc. If anything sustainable has to be created in Somali Region, it definitely needs individual and long-term commitment from the implicated parties.

#### *Post-crisis relief food targeting guidelines for pastoralist areas*

The elaboration of new national food aid targeting guidelines in Ethiopia started in 1997 with an initial study to contribute to the development of new targeting guidelines for government and partner agencies (Sharp, 1997). The elaboration of new national food aid targeting guidelines is under way and the document should soon be available (Reed & Teshome, 2000). Therein the authors state that the draft

guidelines are generally applicable, but specific guidelines relevant to pastoralists should be developed as soon as possible. The authors urge that these guidelines have to take into account the mobility of pastoral populations and that the policy of using food aid for development purposes must be applied in consideration of the pastoralists lifestyles and social structures, which are considerably different from highland farmers'. However, relief food aid targeting for pastoralist areas has not yet been addressed adequately.

Besides the proposed but hardly ever implemented so-called simultaneous relief food distributions, no other alternative has ever been tried. There may be other ways to organise relief food aid targeting and relief food management for pastoralist areas than the now common free distributions. DFID prepared a study on emergency interventions for pastoralist areas. Therein relief food targeting is dealt with in one paragraph. The study will be available soon. Food emergency interventions and particularly relief food aid targeting for pastoralist areas are definitely issues that need to be developed. For the moment, no solution can be suggested. Further investigations into the matter need to be carried out. Therefore, we would like to encourage international organisations in collaboration with government institutions to launch studies and surveys focusing on how to best organise emergency food interventions for pastoralist areas in Ethiopia. Lessons may be learnt from other countries, where eventually such studies were carried out already.

## **Annex**

### ***List of useful reports, papers and previous UN-EUE mission reports***

ACF (2000), Emergency Intervention Korahai Zone, Somali National Regional State, Activity Progress Report, 9 to 21 June, Addis Ababa

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Farah A Y (1992) A general introduction to obscure society: the pastoral economy of the Ethiopian Afar herdsmen in disarray, consultancy report for SCF/US (Save the Children Fund United States), June, Addis Ababa

Farah A Y (1996), Socio-Economic Conditions Affecting Vulnerable Groups in the Rural and Urban Centres in Liben Zone, Somali Region, study undertaken for the UN-EUE, January, Addis Ababa

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Guinand Y (2000b), Gode Mission Report, Rapid Assessment Mission, UN-EUE Mission Report, limited distribution, 24 to 31 May, Addis Ababa

Hammond L, Eggenberger W (1999) Food deliveries to South Welo increased, but targeting remains a problem, UN-EUE Field Mission Report, 22 to 27 August, Addis Ababa

Hararghe Catholic Secretariat (2000), Update on the Drought and Livestock Health Situation in Shinile Zone and Babile Wereda of Somali Region, Field Visit Report, 6 June, Dire Dawa

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- MSF-Belgium (2000), Emergency Intervention Denan, Gode Zone, Somali Regional State, Activity Report 25<sup>th</sup> April to 25<sup>th</sup> June 2000, Addis Ababa
- MSF-France (2000), Medico-Nutritional Support of the Malnourished in Imi East, Gode Zone, Somali National Regional State, activity report 21 May to 2 July 2000, Addis Ababa
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- Sharp K (1997) Targeting Food Aid in Ethiopia, Consultancy Report for Save the Children Fund (UK), Addis Ababa
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- Ugas M, Eggenberger W (1999), Drought and Floods Stress Livelihoods and Food Security in the Ethiopian Somali Region, UN-EUE Assessment Mission Report, 5 to 17 October and 27 October to 2 November, 1 December, Addis Ababa
- UNCT (2000), Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Somali Region, Part I: To Gode, West Imi, Kebre Dehar, Warder and Aware, mission undertaken between 9 and 12 May, a United Nations Country Team for Ethiopia report, 30 May 2000, Addis Ababa
- UNCT (2000), Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Somali Region, Part II: Afder & Liben Zones, mission undertaken between 19 and 21 May 2000, a United Nations Country Team for Ethiopia report, 30 May 2000, Addis Ababa
- UNICEF (2000), Field Visit Report, 8 – 10 June, unpublished field report, UNICEF Jigjiga field office
- USAID (2000), A Field Report of Humanitarian Conditions in Afder Zone, Somali Regional National State, 18 to 21 April 2000, unpublished report prepared by USAID, SCF-US, PCAE & Zonal DPPD, 24 April
- DFID et.al. (1999), Summary of Consolidated Agency Reports on the Emergency Situation in Somali Region, a draft report prepared by DFID, DPPC, Hope for the Horn, OWS, SCK-UK, SCF-US, USAID FEWS, WFP, 19 March, Addis Ababa

**Humanitarian relief inter-actors present in and around Gode Zone  
(as of 14 July 2000)**

**Member of Government Task Force for Relief**

**Co-ordination:**

- Zonal Administrator, Chairperson
- DPPB Head, delegated from Jigjiga to Gode
- Head of Zonal Health Office
- Federal DPPC Representative
- Head of Zonal Agricultural Office
- Head of Zonal DPPD
- Head of Zonal Water Bureau
- Head of Zonal Finance Office
- SERP Manager
- State Farm Manager
- Gode Hospital Director
- Armed Forces Representative
- Head of Zonal Women Affairs Office

- OWS (Ogaden Welfare Society)
- GOAL
- MSF-France (Médecins-sans-Frontières)
- MSF-Belgium
- OXFAM GB
- World Vision International
- OWDA (Ogaden Welfare Development Association)
- Concern
- Guardian-SERRO (local NGO)
- CCM (Comitato Collaborazione Medica)
- THW (Technische Hilfswerke)
- SOS-Children Village (
- FCI (Feed the Children)
- IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organisation)

**International Organisations & NGOs**

- ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)
- SCF-US (Save the Children Fund US)
- SCF-UK

**UN Organisations**

- UNICEF
- WFP
- UN-EUE

**Abbreviations**

ACF	Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger)
ACO	Al-nejah Charity Organisation (local NGO in Jigjiga)
CCM	Comitato Collaborazione Medica
DFID	Department for International Development
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (Federal Government level)
DPPB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (Regional level)
DPPD	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Department (Zonal level)
EFSR	Emergency Food Security Reserve
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
Guardian-SERRO	Guardian-Somali-Ethiopian Relief & Rehabilitation Organisation
HCS	Hararghe Catholic Secretariat
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced People/Person
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organisation
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental-Organisation
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OWS	Ogaden Welfare Society
OWDA	Ogaden Welfare Development Association
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief

PCAE	Pastoralist Concern Association of Ethiopia
SCF-US	Save the Children Fund United States
SCF-UK	Save the Children Fund United Kingdom
SERP	South-East Rangeland Project
SGASP	South Gode Agricultural Settlement Project
TB	Tuberculosis
TFC	Therapeutic Feeding Centre
THW	Technische Hilfswerke (German governmental technical relief organisation)
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-EUE	United Nations Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
USAID	United States Aid for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

### ***Glossary of important meteorological and seasonal terms used for Ethiopia's Somali Region***

#### *Meteorological Drought Defined*

Drought is a period of insufficient water initiated by reduced precipitation. The impacts of drought on crops and society are critical but not easily quantified. The result is that "drought" does not have a universal definition. "Meteorological drought" is defined as a sustained period of deficient precipitation with a low frequency of occurrence. While crops may be damaged by lack of precipitation and high temperatures in just a few days, such short periods are not considered to be meteorological droughts. A three-month period is defined by the American Meteorological Society to be the shortest period that can be defined as a drought. (Source: *The American Meteorological Society*)

#### *Ethiopia's Somali Region's Gu' Rainy Season Defined*

Rainfall in southern Somalia is bimodal, that is, there are two rainy seasons. Rainfall from March through early June affecting main harvest is called the *gu* rains. Sometimes these are also referred to as the "long rains."

#### *Ethiopia's Somali Region Deyr Season Defined*

Rainfall in southern Somalia is bimodal, that is, there are two rainy seasons. Rainfall from late September through to early December affecting an eventual secondary harvest in January/February is called the *deyr* rains. Sometimes these are also called the "short rains". (A fair amount of the *deyr* crop is recessional or irrigated.) Sometimes spelled *der*.

*Ethiopia's Somali Region Haggaa Season Defined*

The time between late June and early September, which is dry and windy with clouds in the sky but rarely with rain. In southern Somalia light coastal showers may fall after the *gu'* and before the *deyr* from July through October.

*Ethiopia's Somali Region Jilal Season Defined*

*Jilal* is the hottest and driest season in the Somali Region between late December and early March.



DISCLAIMER

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20 July 2000

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**UN-EUE**  
**PO Box 60252**  
**Addis Ababa**  
**Ethiopia**

**Tel.: (251) (1) 51-10-28/29**  
**Fax: (251) (1) 51-12-92**  
**E-mail: [undp-eue@telecom.net.et](mailto:undp-eue@telecom.net.et)**  
**[www.telecom.net.et/~undp-eue/](http://www.telecom.net.et/~undp-eue/)**